Miércoles 16 de Agosto de 2017 , Viernes 18 de Agosto de 2017 , Martes 29 de Agosto de 2017 y Jueves 31 de Agosto de 2017
Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades (Av. Capitán Ignacio Carrera Pinto 1025, Ñuñoa)
Workshop abierto a estudiantes de pregrado y postgrado, profesores y otros interesados.
Inscripciones al correo electrónico firstname.lastname@example.org indicando nombre, universidad y carrera de origen, además de una breve explicación de interés en el seminario (máximo 5 líneas).
Las sesiones serán dictadas en inglés. No es obligatorio hablar inglés, aunque sí se debe comprender el idioma. Se enviará un breve bibliografía sugerida para cada sesión.
Epistemic Dependence and Learning from Testimony
Miércoles 16 de agosto
We acquire many of our beliefs through the testimony of others. Indeed, if you want to know much about anything, it seems you must rely on testimony a great deal of the time. We trust our friends and families, from whom we learn all about the world beyond our own experience. For most of us, if we know anything at all about science or history, we know it because we learnt it from our teachers at school and from the testimony of public intellectuals. Presumably, we would all like to have justified beliefs (other things being equal, at least). Perhaps beliefs are justified if they are supported by our evidence, or if they are reliably or responsibly formed. So, when and why should we believe what we are told? How are the beliefs we gain through testimony justified? In this workshop, we will investigate the nature of testimony: What is it? When do we rely on testimony? When does testimony give us justified beliefs?
Viernes 18 de agosto
Some people suffer the injustice of having their testimony undervalued or ignored completely, because of irrelevant facts about their social position. Women’s contributions to supposedly ‘male’ domains are all too often treated dismissively. The testimony of religious and ethnic minorities backgrounds is sometimes excluded from the political discourse. This is testimonial injustice; a kind of epistemic injustice. Another kind of epistemic injustice, called hermeneutical injustice, occurs when an important part of someone’s social experience is hidden or distorted from collective understanding. In this workshop, will investigate epistemic injustice: Who are the victims of epistemic injustice? What kinds of harms does epistemic injustice cause? What can we do to help prevent epistemic injustice?
Martes 29 de agosto
We do not always agree. Seemingly reasonable and well-informed people disagree on diverse matters, from religion and politics to history, science and current affairs. In an open society, we should tolerate disagreement. That is easily said, but what should you do, when you find out that one of your peers disagrees with you? To answer this question is important not only for philosophy but also for the democratic way of life. Should you stick to your guns and ignore the fact someone disagrees with you? You might think that is too dogmatic. So, perhaps you should suspend your judgement about the answer to a question when you find someone disagrees with you about it. This, however, seems too pliant. Perhaps, then, we should think of the fact that someone disagrees with us as evidence. In this workshop, we will investigate the epistemology of disagreement: When does disagreement matter? What is the epistemological significance of disagreement? What should we do, when we find out about disagreement?
Knowledge and the Epistemic Value of the Internet
Jueves 31 de agosto
Unrestricted access to information is a public good. The internet may be the single best resource we have in securing that good. On the internet, knowledge can be aggregated and disseminated across the world in seconds and without being easily restricted or censored. Researchers can collaborate across borders, and their research can be shared with public. Wikipedia and other online encyclopaedias gives us free access to immense libraries of information. Blogging allows us to contribute our own expertise to the public good. We can choose where we read the news and try to get a clear picture of current affairs. Surely, in an open society, such easy access to knowledge is a public good. However, using the internet can be epistemically risky. The personalisation of our engagement with the resources of the internet has led to the emergence of the ‘Daily Me’: We read only what we want to read, and easily avoid dissenting perspectives. This means that we are often trapped in an echo-chamber of our own prejudices. We think we are getting a clear picture of the facts but we end up polarised; whatever our starting point, we end up with more confidence in more extreme beliefs. In this workshop, we will investigate the epistemology of the internet: What epistemic goods does the internet provide? What are the epistemic risks? And what (if anything) can we do to help improve the internet?