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Conferencias y seminarios

Novena Sesión Seminario Permanente Filosofía y Ciencias: "There are no styles of mathematical reasoning"

Fecha

Miércoles 30 de Agosto de 2017

Hora

18:00 hrs.

Lugar

Sala B5, Aulario B (Las Palmeras 3425, Ñuñoa)

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Prof. Otávio Bueno, académico y director del Departmento de Filosofía de la Universidad de Miami

Prof. Otávio Bueno, académico y director del Departmento de Filosofía de la Universidad de Miami

Contenidos vinculados
SCIENTIA: Grupo de Estudios de Filosofía de las Ciencias

La novena sesión del Seminario Permanente Filosofía y Ciencias, "There are no styles of mathematical reasoning", estará a cargo del Prof. Otávio Bueno. 

Otávio Bueno es profesor y director del Department of Philosophy de la University of Miami. Su investigación se enfoca en filosofía de las ciencias, filosofía de la matemática, filosofía de la lógica, epistemología y algo de filosofía del arte. Es autor del libro Applying Mathematics: Immersion, Inference, Interpretation (en co-autoría con Steven French, pronto a aparecer en Oxford University Press), entre otros libros. Ha publicado en revistas tales como: Noûs, Mind, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy of Science, Synthese, Journal of Philosophical Logic, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Analysis, Studies in History of Philosophy of Modern Physics, Erkenntnis, Monist, Metaphilosophy, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, Ratio, History and Philosophy of Logic, and Logique et Analyse. Es el Editor de Synthese y de la serie de libros Synthese Library.

Resumen

The notion of style of scientific reasoning has been used as an analytical tool for the characterization of significant features of scientific practice (in particular, by Crombie [1994], Hacking [2002], and Granger [1988]). Styles of scientific reasoning are different from scientific theories in a given domain of inquiry: styles are broader than theories, and they are not so dependent on features of the particular domain. In this work, I have two main goals. I’ll first provide a characterization of the concept of style of reasoning that overcomes some difficulties that have been raised against this tool (by Bolduc [2014]). I’ll then argue that, despite the broad conception of style I defend, there is no suitable way of formulating a notion of style of mathematical reasoning. Mathematics, I’ll argue, is too malleable, and attempts at characterizing a notion of style in geometry, analysis, algebra or set theory end up yielding just more mathematical theories particular to these domains. Mathematical practice is significantly different from scientific practice in this respect.

Actividad financiada por FONDECYT de Iniciación No. 11160324 “The Physico-Mathematical Structure of Scientific Laws: On the Contribution of Mathematics, Models, Measurements and Metaphysics to the Construction of Laws in Physics”, CONICYT, Chile.

Organiza
SCIENTIA: Grupo de Estudios de Filosofía de las Ciencias
Contacto
Prof. Cristian Soto -
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http://uchile.cl/f135400
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